Saint Louis University Law Journal
Volume 44
Number 3 (Summer 2000)

Article 13

7-20-2000

Not for Import: Why the EU Should not Adopt the American
Efficiency Defense for Analyzing Mergers and Joint Ventures
Thomas L. Greaney
Saint Louis University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Thomas L. Greaney, Not for Import: Why the EU Should not Adopt the American Efficiency Defense for
Analyzing Mergers and Joint Ventures, 44 St. Louis U. L.J. (2000).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj/vol44/iss3/13

This Articles and Essays is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Saint Louis University Law Journal by an authorized editor of Scholarship Commons. For
more information, please contact Susie Lee.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

NOT FOR IMPORT: WHY THE EU SHOULD NOT ADOPT THE
AMERICAN EFFICIENCY DEFENSE FOR ANALYZING MERGERS
AND JOINT VENTURES
THOMAS L. GREANEY*
“To admit an economies defense that proceeds by measurement would force us
to an unacceptably narrow horizon. Economists, like other people, will
measure what is susceptible of measurement and will tend to forget what is
not, though what is forgotten may be far more important than what is
measured.”
Robert Bork1
“The measurement of efficiency. . .[is] an intractable subject for litigation.”
Richard Posner2

The avalanche of mergers and joint ventures with international dimensions
that occurred in the nineties3 has focused attention on the possibility of
convergence or harmonization of the antitrust standards applied by different
nations. As of 1998, over eighty nations had adopted some form of
competition law, and dozens of other countries had competition statutes on the
drawing board.4 Multinational review of mergers and joint ventures has
* Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law. Thanks to Professor Joël Mońeger,
Universite d’Orleans, for his helpful insights.
1. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 127
(1978).
2. RICHARD POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 112 (1976).
3. A large percentage of mergers reviewed by American enforcement agencies have
involved competitive effects beyond American borders. In fiscal year 1998, thirteen of the
twenty-eight merger enforcement actions undertaken by the Federal Trade Commission resulted
in formal notifications to foreign governments, and of those six involved substantial discussions
with foreign authorities also reviewing the mergers. In fiscal year 1999, twenty-one of thirtyeight merger investigations reaching the second requests stage involved notifications to foreign
governments, of which twelve involved “substantial discussions” with foreign authorities.
Richard G. Parker, Global Merger Enforcement, remarks at the International Bar Association,
(Sept. 28, 1999).
4. A. DOUGLAS MELAMED, United States Dep’t of Justice, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT IN A
GLOBAL ECONOMY (1998).
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become commonplace, and arrangements for sharing information, cooperating
at the investigative stages, and in some instances, deferring to the judgment of
Yet the goal of
sister enforcement agencies, have also developed.5
convergence on substantive standards in the form of an international
competition code faces seemingly insurmountable hurdles rooted in political,
cultural and philosophical factors.6 At the same time, there is an unmistakable
evolutionary process by which national authorities have learned from each
others’ experiences and that have caused substantive standards to move to
some extent toward convergence.
Mergers and joint ventures involving large multinational corporations have
garnered the most attention and the law applied by the world’s most prominent
enforcers (the American Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission
and the Commission of the European Union) has shown a surprising degree of
consistency. This has resulted on numerous occasions in close cooperation,
sharing of information and agreement on remedy between these agencies. For
example, in the ABB/Elsag-Bailey merger, the EU and the FTC were able to
reach speedy agreement on the dimensions of the market affected by the
merger (a worldwide market for gas chromatography) and to find common
Likewise, in the mammoth
ground on an appropriate divestiture.7
WorldCom/MCI merger, the Justice Department and the EU Commission
closely cooperated, reaching the same conclusion on the competitive problems
posed by the merger and agreeing to terms of a proposed divestiture of MCI’s

5. Probably the most important form of cooperation occurs through cooperation between
individual antitrust authorities in different nations. These arrangements are facilitated by bilateral agreements between nations or authorities that provide for notification of investigations
affecting the other nation’s interests and cooperation in the evidence gathering process. See, e.g.,
Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the European
Community Regarding the Application of their Competition Laws, Sept. 23, 1991, reprinted in 4
Trade Reg. Rpt. (CCH) ¶ 13,504, and OJ L 95/45 (Apr. 27, 1995), corrected at OJ L 131/38 (15
June 1995). Nations have also reached “positive comity” agreements that provide for formal or
informal requests by a nation that another investigate a matter under its antitrust laws. See
Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the European
Communities regarding the application of positive comity principles in the enforcement of their
competition laws, June 4, 1998, reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rpt. (CCH) ¶ 13,504A; OJ L 173/26
(18 June 1998).
6. Commissioner Karel Von Miert of the Commission of the European Union proposed that
the World Trade Organization members should agree to enact antitrust laws with “common
principles or rules on anticompetitive practices with an international dimension and develop
cooperation instruments and agree to binding arbitration arrangements to assure compliance. See
MELAMED, supra note 4. For the negative American response to that proposal see id.; Joel Klein,
No Monopoly on Antitrust, FINANCIAL TIMES, Feb. 13, 1998.
7. ABB/Elsag-Bailey, Case No. IV/M.139, European Commission decision of 16 Dec.
1998; In the Matter of Abb Ab and Abb Ag, FTC Docket No. C-1867, 64 F.R. 3130. See Parker,
Global Merger Enforcement, supra note 3.
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internet infrastructure assets.8 On the other hand, in a few notable cases, EU
and American authorities took decidedly different positions. Most prominent
was the FTC’s decision not to challenge Boeing’s acquisition of McDonnellDouglas while the EU found that the merger would have anticompetitive
effects and insisted upon certain changes in Boeing’s exclusive contracting
practices as a condition of approving the merger.9 Likewise, in the CibaGeigy/Sandoz merger, the FTC required divestiture based on a relevant market
for gene therapy products and innovation which it believed was adversely
affected by the merger, while the European Union Commission decided not to
seek similar relief.10
The proper role for efficiency analysis in antitrust evaluations of mergers
and joint ventures figured prominently in American antitrust policy in the
1990s. In a series of guidelines and policy statements, the federal enforcement
agencies attempted to clarify the role efficiencies should play when evaluating
mergers and joint ventures. In so doing, they have inadvertently opened the
door for a full scale weighing of efficiencies at both the prosecutorial and
judicial levels. Defendants now regularly assert an efficiency defense in
litigation and, though none have been outcome-determinative as yet, several
courts have undertaken to weigh efficiencies in analyzing mergers.11 With EU
antitrust enforcement evolving from a regime concerned with preserving open
markets to one more focused on competitive analysis, it would come as no
surprise if the EU enforcers likewise moved toward explicit weighing of
efficiencies.12
All this would be fine if there were a working consensus on such
fundamental questions as what kind of efficiencies should be recognized,
whether there were reasonably accurate measurement of harms and efficiency
benefits, and whether balancing of the two were feasible. This essay will argue
that such is decidedly not the case. It will further contend that transplanting
the emerging American approach to Europe will heighten uncertainty in the
review of transnational mergers and perhaps invite nationalism and industrial
8. See MELAMED, supra note 4.
9. Boeing/McDonnell-Douglas, Case No. IV/M. 877, European Commission decision of 30
July 1997, O.J. L336/16 (Dec. 8, 1997); The Boeing Co., et al., Joint Statement Closing
Investigation of Proposed Merger and Separate Statement of Commissioner Mary L. Azcuenaga,
FTC File No. 971-0051 (July 1, 1997), reprinted in 5 Trad. Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 24,295.
10. Ciba-Geigy, Ltd., et al., Consent Order Issued (Mar. 24, 1997) reprinted in 5 Trad. Reg.
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 24,182. Ciba-Geigy/Sandoz, Case No. IV/M. 737, Commission Decision of 17
July 1996, OJ L 201 (July 29, 1997).
11. See, e.g., FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D. D.C. 1997); FTC v. Cardinal
Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp.2d 34 (D. D.C. 1998). See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
12. See Peter D. Camesasca, The Explicit Efficiency Defense in Merger Control: Does It
Make A Difference?, 1999 E.C.L. REV. 14 (1999) (describing the “implicit efficiency defense” in
merger assessments performed by the EU’s Merger Task Force and discussing the possibility of
heightened scrutiny of efficiencies in the future).
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policy to intrude upon these reviews. Finally, the essay offers a few
discouraging words and caveats about the capacity of the litigation process to
handle complex economic inquiries while also warning of the regulatory black
hole awaiting those who undertake efficiency balancing at the prosecutorial
level.
I.

THE EMERGING AMERICAN ANTITRUST EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS

Following up on a commitment made during his confirmation hearings and
pursuing a topic of long-standing academic interest, FTC Chairman Robert
Pitofsky initiated in October 1995 a series of hearings concerning the status of
antitrust law and its role in the changing global economic environment. One of
the issues posed by the hearings was whether “American antitrust enforcement
[has] paid sufficient attention to claims of efficiency.” Following extensive
testimony on this subject, the FTC staff issued, in June 1996, a report entitled
Anticipating The 21st Century: Competition Policy in the New High-Tech
Global Marketplace.13 Responding to some of the suggestions contained in the
FTC Staff Report, but not adopting them wholesale, the FTC and the Justice
Department revised the discussion of efficiencies in their joint guidelines
governing horizontal mergers in 199714 and more recently issued new
“Collaboration Guidelines” on the subject of the agencies’ enforcement
policies respecting joint ventures.15 Though the changes proposed by the FTC
Staff Report and Collaboration Guidelines are neither new nor radical, they
evidence a continuation in the law’s drift toward a more comprehensive and
“dynamic” look at efficiencies in merger and joint venture investigations.
With the likely diffusion of the federal enforcement agencies’ methodology
into litigation and judicial decision-making, these changes, if adopted, are apt
to have an important impact on merger jurisprudence. This section briefly
traces the emerging American approach to analyzing efficiencies arising out of
mergers and joint ventures.
A.

The Revised Merger Guidelines

Given the rather dismal record of the federal agencies on such issues as
geographic market and barriers to entry in litigated merger cases, one might be
a bit surprised that the FTC would voluntarily leap into the efficiencies
quagmire. Indeed, having lost more merger cases in federal court than they

13. FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N, ANTICIPATING THE 21ST CENTURY: COMPETITION POLICY
NEW HIGH-TECH GLOBAL MARKETPLACE, reprinted in ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP.
(BNA) No. 1765 (Special Supp.) (June 6, 1996) [hereinafter FTC Staff Report].
14. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, F.T.C., HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (1997), reprinted in
4 Trade Reg. Rpt. (CCH) ¶ 13,104 [hereinafter MERGER GUIDELINES].
15. COLLABORATION GUIDELINES, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,160-161 [hereinafter
COLLABORATION GUIDELINES].
IN THE
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have won since the early 1980s, the federal agencies might be accused of
hastening the day (if it has not already arrived) that horizontal merger
enforcement takes its place beside vertical and conglomerate merger
enforcement as a relic of an bygone era. Moreover, its announced basis for
considering efficiencies grew out of concerns that ignoring efficiencies in
antitrust reviews might somehow put America at a disadvantage in the global
marketplace. This fear seems highly unrealistic given the relative
sophistication of American antitrust law and the even more restrictive
approach taken by other antitrust authorities.16 At the same time, there is a
growing recognition that antitrust law needs to be more sensitive to efficiency
benefits accruing from mergers particularly through innovation and product
improvement.17
Anyone looking for a roadmap through the efficiencies thicket, however,
will be disappointed by the agencies’ revisions to the Merger Guidelines.
While they tackle several of the thornier issues, few are decisively resolved.
Though drafters assert that they add clarity and consistency to the merger
investigations,18 many critical questions are left unaddressed or are dealt with
in contradictory or opaque language. The net effect is to open the door to a
wide-ranging inquiry by courts or sister antitrust enforcement agencies that
may not feel constrained by the policy choices or administrative conveniencedriven distinctions that the FTC and Department of Justice decided to draw.
The following section describes some of the controversy-laden aspects of the
revisions:
The Welfare Standard to Be Applied. This application of the concept of
efficiency is inextricably linked to one’s view of which concept of welfare the
Clayton Act was designed to protect.19 Professor Lande and Fisher have
persuasively argued that Congress’ primary concern with regard to
anticompetitive mergers focused on preventing transfers of wealth from

16. See Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust, Competitiveness and the World Arena: Efficiencies and
Failing Firms in Perspective, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 725 (1996).
17. See, e.g., Timothy Muris, The Government and Merger Efficiencies: Still Hostile After
All These Years, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 729 (1999); Robert Pitofsky, Proposals for Revised
United States Merger Enforcement in a Global Economy, 81 GEO. L.J. 195 (1992); Joseph
Kattan, Efficiencies and Merger Analysis, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 513 (1994). See also Joseph F.
Brodley, Proof of Efficiencies in Mergers and Joint Ventures, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 575 (1996). The
seminal proposal for an explicit trade off between efficiency benefits and competitive harms is
found in the scholarship of Oliver E. Williamson, see, e.g., Economies as an Antitrust Defense
Revisited, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 699 (1977).
18. Robert Pitofsky, Efficiencies in Defense of Mergers: Two Years After, 7 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 485 (1999).
19. The Report notes the variety of academic views on the purposes and welfare objectives
of the Clayton Act. FTC Staff Report, supra note 13, § I-B.
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consumers to producers.20 Others claim that the proper economic analysis
centers upon allocative efficiency and hence consideration of gains accruing to
producers as well as consumers is appropriate.21 The revisions to the Merger
Guidelines appear to adopt a consumer-focused welfare standard as the
principal criterion for evaluating efficiencies, but do not entirely foreclose the
possibility of applying a total surplus test that would countenance mergers that
enhance market power and do not reduce consumer prices but lower total firm
costs (and increase its profits). Hence the Guidelines state that the agencies
will investigate whether proffered efficiencies “likely would be sufficient to
reverse the merger’s potential to harm consumers in the relevant market, e.g.,
by preventing price increases in that market.”22 Yet they go on to state that the
agencies “also will consider the effects of cognizable efficiencies with no
short-term direct effects on price in the relevant markets.”23 This may signal
receptiveness, though on terms not yet specified, to considering efficiencies
under a total surplus test and thus may permit consideration of fixed cost
savings which are not normally considered under the short-term, price-effect
test.24
Timing. While providing that an ameliorating price effect must be felt in
the “short term,” this proviso is qualified in a number of ways. For example,
the Merger Guidelines state the standard would apply “in most cases,” and that
“delayed” efficiency benefits will be given less weight.25 Moreover, the time
period envisioned by the phrase “short term” is not defined. Whether the time
horizon used in entry analysis section of the Guidelines (up to two years) is
appropriate is unclear.26

20. Alan A. Fisher & Robert H. Lande, Efficiency Considerations in Merger Enforcement,
71 CAL. L. REV. 1580, 1592 (1983) (Congress’ primary concern was with “market power that
would unfairly transfer wealth from consumers to monopolists”). See, e.g., STEPHEN ROSS,
PRINCIPLES OF ANTITRUST LAW (1993) (legislative history suggests Congress would allow
efficiency defense only for a merger of small firms); BORK, supra note 1, at 50-71 (arguing that
narrowly defined consumer welfare, economy-wide allocative efficiency, is the only appropriate
goal); Derek C. Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74
HARV. L. REV. 226, 318 (1960) (“The possibility of lower costs was brushed aside in the
legislative deliberations and there is every reason to believe that Congress preferred the
noneconomic advantages of deconcentrated markets to limited reductions in the cost of
operations.”).
21. BORK, supra note 1, at 50-71 (arguing that narrowly defined consumer welfare,
economy-wide allocative efficiency, is the only appropriate goal).
22. MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 14, § 4.
23. Id. § 4 n.37.
24. Gregory J. Werden, An Economic Perspective on the Analysis of Merger Efficiencies, 11
ANTITRUST 12 (Summer 1997).
25. MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 14, § 4.
26. Id. § 3.
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Which Efficiencies Count? The Guidelines list several criteria for
efficiencies that will be “cognizable.” First, they must be “merger specific,”
that is, they must be likely to be accomplished through the merger and unlikely
to be accomplished in the absence of the merger or through other means having
less anticompetitive effects.27 The Guidelines contemplate the possibility of
achieving efficiencies by alternative means such as licensing or partial
divestitures. At the same time, they disavow requiring alternatives that are not
“practical” or “insist[ing] on a less restrictive alternative that is merely
theoretical.”28
A second criterion is that efficiencies be “verifiable.” By this, the
Guidelines intend that merging parties must substantiate their claims in a
manner that permits the agencies to verify the likelihood, magnitude and cost
of the efficiencies, the manner in which they will enhance incentives and
abilities to compete, and the reasons why they are merger specific. While the
Guidelines do not purport to frame questions in legal terms that a court might
employ, it is notable that language requiring “clear and convincing evidence,”
contained in earlier government guidelines was dropped in an earlier iteration
At a minimum this change signaled a greater
of the Guidelines.29
receptiveness to efficiencies despite continuing difficulties in proof.
Finally, the Guidelines list favored and disfavored efficiencies. Several
prominent commentators have endorsed a categorization approach that
classifies efficiencies based on their relative importance and susceptibility of
proof and contemplates that antitrust tribunals should, as a matter of law, limit
the defense according to these classifications. For example, Professor Areeda
and his co-authors proposed that economies of scale and scope should
generally be recognized, while economies in distribution, promotion and R &
D which present relatively weak cases for consideration should be subject to
more rigorous analysis. Others, such as managerial economies and savings in
capital cost, procurement, or overhead, should generally not be recognized.30
By contrast, the Guidelines stop short of ruling out categories of efficiencies,
instead noting that certain kinds tend to be less likely to be cognizable,
verifiable or substantial than others.
Efficiencies Outside the Relevant Markets. Rather surprisingly, the
Guidelines indicate that the agencies will consider whether strong efficiencies
found in markets other than those in which the merger may have
anticompetitive effects outweigh the potential harms to competition. Several
27. Id. § 4.
28. Id.
29. 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,103 [hereinafter 1984 GUIDELINES].
30. 4A PHILLIP AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 975 (1998); see also Brodley, supra note
17, at 579-82 (efficiencies defense should recognize production and innovation efficiencies, reject
pecuniary and managerial economies, and admit capital raising economies only on a strong
showing that they are real economies).
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caveats apply, however. For example, the magnitude of the efficiencies must
be large and the risk of anticompetitive harm small. Also, the markets must be
“inextricably linked,”31 and the government reserves its option of arguing that
such effects should be given no weight in court,32 at least when exercising
prosecutorial discretion. However, the agencies may elect to trade off
efficiencies in one market against another.
How are efficiencies to be weighed? The Guidelines seem to suggest that
the agencies do not intend to measure or weigh efficiencies and
anticompetitive harms in an attempt to calculate the “welfare trade-off.”33 In
rather opaque terms, they sketch an analytic process that evaluates the effect of
efficiencies on the overall competitiveness of the market after the merger.34 At
the same time, however, much of the language of the Guidelines is couched in
terms of undertaking just such a quantitative comparison.35 For example, the
Guidelines are clear that efficiency claims must be commensurate with
potential harms. In this regard, a sliding scale analysis is employed: large
anticompetitve effects require “extraordinarily great” efficiencies. Moreover,
efficiencies “almost never” justify mergers to monopoly. By their own
account therefore, the Agencies envision some quantitative assessment,
however crude, of losses and gains attributable to mergers.
Proof Burdens and Presumptions
The Merger Guidelines are conspicuously silent on the important questions
of what proof burdens and presumptive rules should apply to the efficiencies
analysis. Indeed, the 1992 Merger Guidelines36 removed the requirement of
prior guidelines that efficiencies be proved by “clear and convincing
evidence.”37 This seems to reflect more than the disinclination of the agencies
to allocate burdens of proof in their guidelines. According to a former
Assistant Attorney General, this change was made to allay concerns that the

31. MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 14, § 4.
32. Id.
33. See Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as An Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Trade-Offs,
58 AM. ECON. REV. 18 (1968); see also Muris, supra note 17.
34. MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 14, § 4 (The agencies “will not simply compare the
magnitude of cognizable efficiencies with the magnitude of the likely harm absent the
efficiencies. The greater the potential adverse competitive effect of the merger [as indicated by
concentration data and analysis of effects and entry conditions] the greater must be cognizable
efficiencies.”).
35. See MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 14, § 4 (showing of “extraordinarily great”
efficiencies required to forestall challenge where anticompetitive effects are “particularly large”
are “most likely to make a difference . . . when the likely adverse competitive effects, absent the
efficiencies, are not great”).
36. 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,104.
37. 1984 GUIDELINES, supra note 29.
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government was not sufficiently recognizing efficiencies and to make it clear
that efficiencies would be accorded the same significance as other factors.38
Paths Not Taken
The revisions declined to follow recommendations that would have
confined the inquiry to a set of limited questions that avoid explicitly balancing
efficiencies against anticompetitive harms or would defer such reviews until
after the merger had been consummated. For example, the FTC Staff Report
proposed a two-part test that would require that proponents of proposed
mergers to: (1) credibly demonstrate that the merger will create efficiencies;
and (2) show how the resulting efficiencies will reduce the likelihood that any
potential anticompetitive effects will arise from the merger and/or will improve
the competitive dynamic in the postmerger market.39 The merging parties
would still bear the burdens of demonstrating the efficiencies and establishing
that they cannot reasonably be achieved through less restrictive means. In
addition, the FTC Staff Report seemed to suggest that proposed justifications
should be subject to the test of whether proffered efficiencies are likely to
change the merged firms’ incentives and abilities so as to deter the possible
exercise of market power.40 This limited approach neatly avoids having to
“balance” (and hence specifically calculate the magnitude of) efficiencies and
anticompetitive losses or to evaluate whether cost savings will be “passed on”
to consumers. Under this methodology, the clearest case for applying the
defense occurs where it can be shown that efficiencies exert a positive effect
on competition by deterring the exercise of market power. For example,
mergers of non-leading firms may enhance competition by making them more
formidable rivals, less likely to collude or passively accept price leadership by
the dominant firm(s). Several other proposals have been advanced to develop
structured, truncated evaluations of efficiencies that rely on classifications,
presumptive rules and other methodologies but stop short of attempting to
balance efficiencies against harms.41
Another road not taken by the agencies is the use of a subsequent review
process to evaluate claims by merging parties. The FTC Staff Report
recommended that in certain cases, parties should be allowed to consummate a
proposed merger subject to an agreement. The FTC or DOJ would then review
38. FTC Staff Report, supra note 13, ch. 2, § III-H, n.156 (quoting James Rill, a former
Assistant Attorney General of the Antitrust Division).
39. FTC Staff Report, supra note 13.
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., Ann I. Jones, Comments for the Federal Trade Commission, FTC Hearings.
(visited Mar. 20, 2000) <http://www.ftc.gov/opp/global/jones_ai.htm>. See also Statement of
Robert Lande at FTC Hearings, (visited May 1, 2000) <http://www.ftc.gov/opp/global/GC111
495.htm>; Robert Lande, Remarks at the meeting of the Federal Trade Commission on Global &
Innovation-based Competition (Nov. 14, 1995) (transcript available at http://www.ftc.gov).
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ex post whether the merger actually resulted in the claimed efficiencies. Under
this procedure, the merged entity would be at risk if the claimed efficiencies
failed to materialize or if anticompetitive effects arose from the merger.
Advocates point out that this procedure reduces the incentives for merging
firms to overestimate efficiency gains and counters the inherent uncertainty of
predicting efficiencies ex ante. This approach was tested in the
Hoechst/Marion Merrell Dow merger in which Hoechst was allowed to
consummate the merger before the FTC had completed its investigation.42 The
FTC agreed to allow the merger to proceed subject to the acquirer’s agreement
to divest any of a predefined list of drugs which the FTC could later determine
in its sole discretion were necessary to divest. In a similar vein, several state
attorneys general have conditioned approval of mergers on monetary
settlements predicated on promised efficiency savings.43
Despite a fair amount of enthusiasm for this idea in academic circles,44 it
was regarded by the FTC as impractical because of problems associated with
monitoring the business affairs of the merged entity, difficulties inherent in
unscrambling completed mergers, and the reluctance of judges to take on
supervisory responsibilities of this sort. However, the Report suggested that
the procedure might be most appropriate for joint ventures and mergers in
which the parties volunteer and make a credible commitment to divest if
anticipated efficiencies are not realized. In view of the criticism offered by a
number of practitioners that the agencies do not follow their own guidelines
and almost never conclude at the investigative stage that efficiencies will save
an otherwise anticompetitive merger,45 this approach would have the salutary
effect of forcing both sides to perform the efficiencies inquiry in an appropriate
manner.
B.

Efficiencies in Joint Venture Analysis

When looking at the agencies’ treatment of efficiencies in joint venture
analysis, one finds an unambiguous endorsement of balancing. For example,
in the Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Health Care, the agencies
repeatedly state that an assessment of a health care joint venture requires a
balancing of the joint venture’s likely pro-competitive efficiencies against any

42. Hoechst AG, C-3629, 5 Trade Reg. Rept. (CCH) (FTC Dec. 5, 1995).
43. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Capital Health Sys. Servs., 1995-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 71,205
(M.D. Pa. 1995). See generally Thomas L. Greaney, Regulating for Efficiency Through the
Antitrust Laws, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 465, 486-89 (1995).
44. See Brodley, supra note 17; Pitofsky, supra note 17. But see Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust,
Competitiveness and the World Arena: Efficiencies and Failing Firms in Perspective, 64
ANTITRUST L.J. 725 (1996).
45. Mergers and Acquisitions: Trends in Antitrust Oversight of Mergers, Joint Ventures
Discussed by Practitioners, Antitrust Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) (Mar. 25, 1999).
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likely anticompetitive effects. For example, in assessing the impact of
provider controlled networks, the Policy Statements provide as follows:
Step 3: Evaluate the Impact of Procompetitive Efficiencies. This step requires
an examination of the joint venture’s likely procompetitive efficiencies, and
the balancing of these efficiencies against any likely anticompetitive effects.
The greater the venture’s likely anticompetitive effects, the greater must be the
venture’s likely efficiencies.46

Essentially identical analytical processes are recommended for evaluating
health care high technology joint ventures.47 The Department of Justice
Intellectual Property Guidelines likewise state that the agencies will balance
procompetitive efficiencies and anticompetitive effects to determine the
probable net effect of restraints in licensing arrangements on competition, but
add the caveat that this comparison “is necessarily a qualitative” one, a
provision not found elsewhere in Department guidelines.48
In their most recent guidelines, the Antitrust Guidelines for Collaboration
Among Competitors,49 the agencies provide the most detailed statement of
their views on weighing efficiencies generated by joint ventures. Following
generally the Merger Guidelines’ approach, the Collaboration Guidelines
require proof of “cognizable efficiencies” that are verifiable and reasonably
necessary, and then go on to state:
[T]he Agencies assess the likelihood and magnitude of cognizable efficiencies
and anticompetitive harms to determine the agreement’s overall actual or likely
effect on competition in the relevant market. To make the requisite
determination, the Agencies consider whether cognizable efficiencies likely
would be sufficient to offset the potential of the agreement to harm consumers
in the relevant market, for example, by preventing price increases (footnote
omitted).
The agencies’ comparison of cognizable efficiencies and anticompetitive
harms is necessarily an approximate judgment. In assessing the overall
competitive effect of an agreement, the Agencies consider the magnitude and
likelihood of both the anticompetitive harms and cognizable efficiencies from
the relevant agreement.

46. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N, STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT POLICY IN HEALTH CARE (1996), 4 Trade Reg. (CCH) ¶ 13,153 [hereinafter
Health Policy Stmt.].
47. Health Policy Stmt. 2, Statement on Hospital Joint Ventures Involving High Technology
or Other Expensive Equipment; Health Policy Stmt. 3, Statement on Joint Ventures Involving
Specialized Clinical or Other Expensive Services.
48. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY (1995).
49. Draft of ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATION AMONG COMPETITORS, issued
Oct. 1, 1999.
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It thus appears that the agencies have pulled back from earlier policy
statements that endorsed an open-ended approach to balancing. In keeping
with the analysis contained in the Merger Guidelines, joint ventures
efficiencies apparently will be held to standards of cognizability and
reasonable necessity.
The Collaboration Guidelines also include an
appropriate caveat that the process entails approximate judgments, and
seemingly signal that they may not always essay even rough quantitative
assessments. At the same time, however, the truncated analyses contained in
Collaboration Guidelines evidence no reliance on presumptive approaches or
other devices that might usefully cabin the factfinders inquiry. It is not entirely
clear whether this approach reflects refinements in the agencies’ methodology
for analyzing efficiencies or whether it is dictated by the special circumstances
created by joint ventures. Although a more lenient approach for joint ventures
might be justified because of their less permanent nature and hence lower risk
of harm, realizing efficiencies nonetheless may be problematic in the joint
venture setting because of the parties’ unwillingness to fully share advantages
and learning in such an enterprise.50
C. Assessing the American Approach
Despite extensive attention paid to the subject, proponents of an expanded
efficiencies defense for mergers and joint ventures have failed to muster a
convincing showing that prior antitrust policy chilled parties from undertaking
mergers that would benefit consumers or that government action blocked such
mergers.51 Given the generous levels of concentrations permissible under
current merger law (which most commentators agree allows parties to capture
most scale and scope economies),52 and the leniency with which contemporary
antitrust doctrine interprets mergers,53 it is not likely that many mergers fail to
achieve efficient size. Further, the evidence points strongly to the conclusion
that determining ex ante whether a merger will generate significant efficiencies
is an extraordinarily difficulty task. Thus, studies demonstrating that a large
number of mergers fail to realize projected efficiency gains illustrate that those
in the best position to assess the probability and magnitude of prospective
efficiencies, the merging parties themselves, routinely err.54 Indeed, by some
50. See generally Brodley, supra note 17.
51. For broad assurances that efficiency trade offs can be performed, see Robert Pitofsky,
FTC Staff Report on Competition Policy: Six Months After, Remarks Before the ABA Section on
Antitrust Law (Nov. 7, 1996). For strong expressions of skepticism, see Brodley, supra note 17;
AREEDA ET AL., supra note 30.
52. AREEDA ET AL., supra note 30.
53. Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust, Competitiveness and the World Arena: Efficiencies and
Failing Firms in Perspective, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 725 (1996).
54. DAVID J. RAVENSCRAFT & F.M. SCHERER, MERGERS, SELL-OFFS, AND ECONOMIC
EFFICIENCY (1987); After the Deal, ECONOMIST, Jan. 9, 1999 (explaining that “study after study
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estimates, sixty to eighty percent of all mergers prove unsuccessful.55 When
one expands the inquiry into critically important, but necessarily inchoate,
dimensions of efficiency such as quality of health care products and services
or synergies resulting from shared know-how, technology or research, the level
of imprecision and subjectivity in efficiency analysis escalates geometrically.56
Adding the further “dynamic” dimension of assessing the degree to which
efficiencies may or may not diffuse throughout markets as a result of a merger
or joint venture also seems essential,57 though the process invites complexities
likely to exceed he capacities of the courts. With the empirical record raising
legitimate questions about how effectively courts and enforcement agencies
can predict and quantify efficiencies, it would seem appropriate to hold
proponents of a more complete trade-off analysis to prove the predictive
reliability of their methods.
On the other side of the balancing ledger, the prospects for accurate
analysis appear even bleaker. Neither the measures of concentration nor other
structural indices give a very accurate picture of the magnitude of competitive
harm resulting from mergers. Imprecision in the definition of markets and
calculation of concentration data, along with the lack of information about firm
strategies, makes reliable estimates of the likely losses impossible.58 Most
courts seem to recognize this and thus resort to evidentiary or presumptive
short cuts to avoid the process.59 Even those that use the terminology of
balancing are not actually assigning a common unit of measurement to the
harms and benefits and then determining which outweighs the other.60
Another notable feature of the efficiency approach is the absence of useful
rules for performing the inquiry. While the least-restrictive alternative test
of past merger waves has shown that two of every three deals have not worked . . . [although]
buyers have justified deals by citing questionable synergies”). See also The Case Against
Mergers, BUS. WEEK, Oct. 30, 1995 (noting that businesses often cannot predict accurately which
mergers are likely to create efficiencies).
55. Brodley, supra note 17, at 576.
56. See Thomas L. Greaney, Regulating for Efficiency in Health Care through the Antitrust
Laws, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 465, 491-92 (discussing the problems of performing efficiency
analyses in the health care sector). See generally Joseph F. Brodley, Proof of Efficiencies in
Mergers and Joint Ventures, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 575 (1996).
57. Gary L. Roberts & Steven C. Salop, Efficiency Benefits in Dynamic Merger Analysis,
WORLD COMPETITION (1996).
58. AREEDA ET AL., supra note 30, ¶ 976 (noting that “in the great majority of cases we can
do no better than play a hunch about the magnitude of competitive harms resulting from a
merger.”).
59. See discussion of efficiencies defense in merger litigation infra; see also Brodley, supra
note 17, at n.38 (survey of cases through 1996 involving efficiency defense, finding sixteen cases
in which courts evaluated less restrictive alternatives and none which evaluated efficiencies in
any meaningful way; one case, U.S. v. United Tote, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 1064 (D. Del. 1991),
employing conclusory assessment of competitive effects and efficiency benefits).
60. AREEDA ET AL., supra note 30, ¶ 976.
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avoids balancing, it cannot be said to constitute a substitute; at best it
circumvents the inquiry, but provides no assurance that consumer interests will
be addressed in merger reviews.61 Merger simulations using econometric
methodologies does not afford a silver bullet for evaluating efficiencies in
mergers and joint ventures. Those methodologies provide only insights into
the anticompetitive effects of the merger and are unhelpful regarding the
quantification of efficiencies and are subject to considerable discretion in
application.62 The conclusion that balancing “is simply not what courts are
capable of doing”63 seems inescapable.
How are courts likely to react to the Agencies’ approach to efficiencies?
Although the several merger and joint venture guidelines expressly disavow
any intention to describe how the agencies will present evidence in litigating
merger cases,64 courts frequently cite the Guidelines and sometimes hold the
government to those standards where it appears they are advocating a different
position in court.65 It is far from clear that, in performing efficiency analyses,
courts will feel constrained to follow the Guidelines’ limitations which are not
sharply defined or clearly explained or are based on considerations of
administrative convenience. In sum, although they commonly use shortcuts to
truncate (or sidestep) the inquiry, courts generally perceive their task as
conducting an open-ended balancing of harms against savings and rarely resort
to tools such as classifying efficiencies, use of the consumer standard or
otherwise narrow the scope of the efficiency trade-off.
D. Efficiencies Analyses in Litigation
Although the Supreme Court stated over forty years ago that “possible
economies cannot be used as a defense to illegality in Section 7 merger cases,”
virtually all courts considering the issue in recent years have permitted an
efficiencies defense at least to the extent that it may be used to rebut the
government’s prima facie case.66 Courts tackling the efficiencies issue have
61. Cf. Brodley, supra note 56 at 585 (stating that the least restrictive alternative test “must
lead either to strained applications or illfounded attempts to engage in explicit balancing”).
62. See Craig W. Conrath & Nicholas A. Widnell, Efficiency Claims in Merger Analysis:
Hostility or Humility?, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 685 (1995).
63. Id.; see also POSNER, supra note 2; BORK, supra note 1; Brodley, supra note 56 (noting
that leading proponents fail to explicate how balancing might take place).
64. MERGER GUIDELINES § 0.1. Although efficiencies have influenced the FTC’s decision
not to challenge a few mergers since the amendments to the Merger Guidelines, the litigated
cased decided since 1997 have not entailed the kind of balancing approach suggested by the
guidelines. See Robert Pitofsky, Efficiencies in Defense of Mergers: Two Years After, 7 GEO.
MASON. L. REV. 485 (1999).
65. See, e.g., United States v. Waste Management, Inc. 743 F.2d 976, (2d Cir. 1984).
66. FTC v. Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1222 (11th Cir. 1991) (defendant may rebut
the government’s prima facie case with evidence showing that the merger would create
significant efficiencies in the relevant market); FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp.2d 45
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several times found substantial efficiencies,67 though sometimes mitigating that
finding by concluding that the efficiencies were not merger specific or were
equally likely to be forthcoming from competition in the market.68 Others
have rejected defendants’ proffered efficiencies as speculative, unverified, or
uncertain.69 Commentators have noted the symmetry between the conclusions
reached by courts on the competitive effects of mergers and their resolution of
the efficiencies defense. Most courts finding substantial efficiencies do so
only where they also conclude that the merger would not be likely to
substantially lessen competition.70
For better or worse, hospital mergers have become a proving ground in
American courts for weighing efficiencies in antitrust cases. These cases are
instructive in that they demonstrate the unwillingness of antitrust tribunals to
face up to the task of balancing efficiencies and the intractable nature of many
of the factual issues that arise. As a result, most courts have employed
evidentiary presumptions and relied on the placement of the burden of proof to
evade trade off analyses.
In some respects, the hospital industry is well-suited for efficiencies
analysis; in others, decidedly not. Clearly, the industry suffers from significant
overcapacity attributable to government policies, inefficient reimbursement
methodologies and rapid technological change causing shifts in where many
procedures are performed.71 Moreover, conditions on both the demand and
supply side are changing rapidly to deal with the new environment. These
cataclysmic changes occurring in heath care financing and delivery make it
extraordinarily difficult to predict with confidence what kinds of savings are

(D.D.C. 1998) (recognizing defense but finding that substantial efficiencies that would be
achieved by merger could also be attained by competitive process); FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F.
Supp. 1066, 1090 (D.D.C. 1997) (considering but ultimately rejecting as unverified and not
merger-specific defendants’ claimed efficiencies); United States v. Long Island Jewish Hosp.,
983 F. Supp. 121 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); Cf. FTC v. Coca-Cola Co., 641 F. Supp. 1128, 1141 (D.D.C.
1986) vacated as moot, 829 F.2d 191 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
67. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp.2d 45; Long Island Jewish Hosp., 983 F. Supp. 121.
See also Tenet Healthcare Corp. v. FTC, 186 F.3d 1045 (8th Cir. 1999) (stating in dicta that
district court should have paid greater attention to efficiencies).
68. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp.2d 45.
69. FTC v. Tenet Healthcare Corp. 17 F. Supp.2d 937 (E.D. Mo. 1998), rev’d on other
grounds, 186 F.3d 1045 (8th Cir. 1999); Staples, 970 F. Supp. at 1090.
70. Joseph Kattan, Efficiencies and Merger Analysis, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 513, 516 (1994).
71. See Joe Sims, A New Approach to the Analysis of Hospital Mergers, 64 ANTITRUST L. J.
633 (1996) (contending that the peculiarities of hospital markets require altering application of
conventional presumptions in merger analysis; also urging more receptive treatment of
defendants’ efficiency claims).
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attributable to a given merger and what less restrictive alternatives might
exist.72
Federal courts have closely examined defendants’ efficiencies claims in
seven hospital merger cases. In three of those cases, the district court made
rather cursory findings to the effect that defendants had presented plausible
efficiency claims.73 One other district court relied in part on evidence of
efficiencies in finding that the hospitals had rebutted the government’s prima
facie case,74 and another endorsed in dicta the defendants’ claim.75 In the only
appellate case,76 three district court cases,77 and several FTC administrative
proceedings78 on the subject, defendants’ proof on the efficiencies has been
found wanting. For their part, the federal enforcement agencies have taken the
position that they may weigh efficiencies in deciding whether or not to
challenge a merger,79 while occasionally arguing that efficiencies
considerations are not cognizable by federal courts.
Several observations may be made about the decided cases. First, with one
exception, courts have followed a pattern of symmetry between their findings
on the merits of the government’s merger case and their treatment of
efficiencies. That is, courts ruling for defendants on other grounds uphold
their efficiency claims, while those concluding that the merger will lessen
competition reject efficiencies claims.80 Courts thus may be taking the easy
way out on this complex issue.
Second, a number of courts have held defendants to a high standard of
proof, e.g., “clear and convincing evidence” on efficiencies defenses.81 The
cases also sometimes fault defendants for failing to prove “net efficiencies”:
72. See Thomas L. Greaney, Night Landings on an Aircraft Carrier: Hospital Mergers and
Antitrust Law, 23 AM. J.L. & MED. 1991 (1997).
73. See FTC v. Freeman Hosp., 911 F. Supp. 1213 (W.D. Mo. 1995), aff’d, 69 F.3d 260 (8th
Cir. 1995); United States v. Carilion Health Sys., 707 F. Supp. 840 (W.D. Va.), aff’d, 892 F.2d
1042 (4th Cir. 1989); FTC v. Univ. Health, Inc., 1991-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 69,444 (S.D. Ga.
1991), rev’d, 938 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1991).
74. FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 2385 (W.D. Mich. 1996).
75. See Long Island Jewish Hosp., 983 F. Supp. 121.
76. See Univ. Health, 938 F.2d 1206.
77. Tenet, 17 F. Supp.2d 937, United States v. Mercy Hosp., 902 F. Supp. 968 (N.D. Iowa
1995); United States v. Rockford Mem’l Corp., 717 F. Supp. 1251 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
78. American Medical Int’l, 104 F.T.C. 1, 219-20 (1984); Hospital Corp. of Amer. 106
F.T.C. 361 (1985). See generally Mary Lou Steptoe, Acting Director, Bureau of Competition,
Federal Trade Commission, Efficiency Justifications for Hospital Mergers, Remarks before
Practicing Law Institute (June 17, 1994).
79. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES § 4 (1992). The government’s changing position on efficiencies is described in the
FTC Staff Report, supra note 13, ch. 2, § I-C.
80. The lone exception is United States v. Mercy Hospital, 902 F. Supp. 968 (N.D. Iowa
1995).
81. See, e.g., Rockford Mem’l, 717 F. Supp. at 1289; Hospital Corp. 106 F.T.C., at 361.
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that is, in quantifying efficiencies, defendants neglected to deduct the cost of
achieving savings from the total savings anticipated.82 The latter has been an
important issue as hospitals claiming efficiencies arising out of renovation and
replacement of facilities must offset the costs of those improvements along
with any changes in quality.83 Other courts have relied upon credibility
findings regarding the parties’ experts or the probative value of the information
on which they relied. Finally, many courts have noted that defendants have
failed to prove that efficiencies would be passed on to the consumer. These
techniques have enabled courts to evade the difficult factual inquiry into the
magnitude of efficiencies and the degree of potential anticompetitive harm
flowing from the merger.
Third, while a wide variety of efficiencies have been considered in various
cases, those involving economies in scale and scope, as well as savings
resulting from combined administrative functions, have proven the most
successful.84 Indeed, in litigation, the government has often conceded the
validity of such efficiencies in principle while vigorously disputing their
magnitude or the feasibility of their being implemented. As a general matter,
the agencies take the position that preferred efficiencies include better use of
fixed cost assets and elimination of duplicative services, while other kinds of
efficiencies, such as savings in the cost of capital and shared inputs, are
suspect, primarily because they can often be accomplished without merger.
Scale economies and other savings, from consolidating programs operated at
less than efficient levels, are readily identifiable and estimated.85 Courts have
been skeptical of purported savings resulting from improved information and
use of “best practices” resulting from mergers, contending that such savings
readily obtained through other means and were difficult to quantify.86 Notably,
in the most recent hospital merger case, the Eighth Circuit found that the lower
court should have explicitly weighed quality-enhancing aspects of the merger
against anticompetitive harms under an efficiency analysis.87 Thus, the
82. Id.
83. For a good analysis of this issue, see Steptoe, supra note 78.
84. See, e.g., Univ. Health, 938 F.2d 1206 (savings from eliminating equipment duplications
and administrative savings); Rockford Mem’l, 717 F. Supp. at 1288 (elimination of duplicative
services, consolidation of overhead); Freeman Hosp., 911 F. Supp. 1213.
85. A clear explanation of the economist’s methodology for appraising efficiencies in
hospital merger cases is found in Barry C. Harris & William P. Hall, Balancing Efficiencies and
Competition in Hospital Mergers, 8 A.B.A. SEC. ANTITRUST HEALTH CARE CHRON., No. 3, 2
(1994).
86. Mercy Hosp., 902 F. Supp. at 987-89.
87. In Tenet v. FTC, the court stated as follows:
We further find that although Tenet’s efficiencies defense may have been properly
rejected by the district court, the district court should nonetheless have considered
evidence of enhanced efficiency in the context of the competitive effects of the merger.
The evidence shows that a hospital that is larger and more efficient than Lucy Lee or
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litigated cases have sidestepped many important but hard-to-quantify
efficiencies.
Finally, in the hospital cases, the efficiencies defense has become an
invitation to explicit regulation by court decree. In F.T.C. v. Butterworth
Health Corporation,88 for example, the court found that the merger would
produce significant “capital avoidance” savings. Notably, the district court
accepted the efficiencies defense without explicitly weighing the purported
savings (found to be in excess of $100 million) against any specific finding of
potential harm to competition. The potential harm to competition, the court
acknowledged, was manifest in that case because the merger created a near
monopoly in the relevant market. It found this risk mitigated by the merged
hospital’s not-for-profit status and the parties’ voluntary commitment to take
various steps to assure that prices would be kept low. Remarkably, these
commitments, contained in a court-approved consent decree, include
provisions freezing prices at pre-merger levels, limiting profit levels, assuring
services to the medically needy, and establishing governance of the merged
entity. In implicitly finding that efficiency savings would outweigh whatever
competitive harms might result from the merger, however, the court explicitly
acknowledged its inability to calculate net efficiencies or to perform the
welfare trade-off.89 Instead, it noted a disparity in the quality of the studies
performed by the parties’ experts, voiced its greater confidence in the
defendants’ expert, and gave considerable weight to its own impressions based
on a tour of the hospital facilities in the relevant market. Other district courts
have likewise used rather vague findings of efficiencies to buttress their
conclusions that the merger would not lessen competition.90
The rather loose and imprecise approach to “weighing” efficiencies against
harms seen in the hospital merger cases, though perhaps understandable in
view of the uncertainties involved, is a far cry from the balancing anticipated
by proponents of the efficiencies defense. In addition, it should be emphasized
that assessing efficiencies is particularly hard in a case in which the market is
changing rapidly. For example, the court opined that Butterworth would likely

Doctors’ Regional will provide better medical care than either of those hospitals could
separately. The merged entity will be able to attract more highly qualified physicians and
specialists and to offer integrated delivery and some tertiary care.
186 F.3d 1045, 1054 (8th Cir. 1999).
88. 946 F. Supp. 1285 (W.D. Mich. 1996).
89. The court stated:
Because measuring the efficiencies of a proposed transaction is inherently difficult and
because both sides’ estimates are clearly based in some measure on speculative selfserving assertions . . . the [c]ourt finds it neither appropriate nor necessary to engage in a
detailed evaluation of the competing views.
Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 1301.
90. See supra note 73.
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proceed with plans to renovate and expand its facilities in order to compete
with the new state of the art facility planned by Blodgett, concluding “a
medical arms race would thus continue, at great expense to defendants and
ultimately to consumers.”91 Such findings obviously rest on a myriad of
assumptions about the pace of development of managed contracting, the
current competitiveness of the market, and other factors. Confident judgments
about how much would be spent in the future absent the market seem so
speculative as to call into question the capacity of courts to make such
predictions confidently in a changing market.
II. TREATMENT OF EFFICIENCIES UNDER THE EU MERGER REGULATION
Contrary to assertions by American antitrust officials that competition
authorities in the Commission of the European Union and its member states
regularly take efficiencies into account when reviewing mergers,92 efficiencies
have played a negligible role in European analyses. Though this claim was
made to justify an expanded role for efficiencies in American enforcement, it
does not withstand close scrutiny. This section argues that EU competition
policy has refrained from adopting an explicit efficiencies defense and that
efficiencies have rarely, if ever, played an important role in decisions to clear
mergers or accept restructuring proposals.
Mergers with a “community dimension”93 in the EU are governed by the
Merger Regulation adopted by the Council of Ministers in 1989.94 The
regulation mandates prior notification of proposed “concentrations” to the
competition directorate (DG-IV) of the Commission. A substantive review of
mergers is generally performed by the Merger Task Force at the Commission.
The Merger Regulation governs “concentrations” and mandates an inquiry as
to whether they are compatible with the common market, interpreted to
prohibit any that “creates or strengthens a dominant position as a result of
which effective competition would be significantly impeded in the common
market or in a substantial part of it.”95 Although the Merger Regulation does
not speak to the issue of extraterritorial enforcement, the Commission has
invoked jurisdiction in a number of recent cases.96
91. Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 1301.
92. Remarks of Robert Pitofsky, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission, The Effect of Global
Trade on United States Competition Law and Enforcement Policies (Oct. 15, 1999).
93. Council Regulation 1310/97 of June 30, 1997 O.J. (L 180) (amending Merger Regulation
to reach mergers in which the undertakings have a combined worldwide turnover of at least $2.5
billion ECU; in which each undertaking has an EU wide turn over of at least 100 million ECU;
and other requirements respecting turnover in at least three Member States).
94. Commission of Council Regulation 4064/89.
95. Id.
96. Jurisdiction has been asserted in cases in which the merging parties have limited assets
in the EU, Boeing/McDonnell Douglas; and in which the assets of the merging parties giving rise
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The Merger Regulation contains no provision governing efficiencies.
However, under Article 2(1)(b), the Commission is directed to consider
whether a concentration will likely result in “the development of technical and
economic progress provided that it is to consumers’ advantage and does not
form an obstacle to competition.”97 The language of Article 2(1)(b) is derived
from Article 85(3) and is construed in light of the decisions of the European
Court of Justice and other jurisprudence surrounding that doctrine.98 Although
Article 85(3) has had some influence on the development and analysis of
agreements in the EU, the concept of technical and economic progress has
played almost no role in substantive merger analysis by the Commission.
Indeed the history99 and text100 of Article 2(1)(b) does not support explicit
trade-offs between efficiencies and market power. Consequently, most leading
commentators agree that no efficiency defense can be found in EU merger
analyses to date.101
A review of the handful of cases in which the Commission has considered
potential advantages associated with technical and economic progress resulting
from mergers, reveals that the factor has not played a role in any clearance by
the Merger Task Force and at most appears to have been considered as a factor
to competition concerns are located outside of the EU, Gencor/Lonrho, Case IV/M619 (Apr. 24,
1996) 1997 O.J. (L11) 30.
97. EU Merger Regulation Article 2(1)(b).
98. See Commission of European Communities, Nineteenth Report on Competition Policy
266 (1990).
99. Earlier drafts of the Merger Regulation contained broad language that might have
allowed an efficiencies trade off, as well as non-economic factors, to trump a finding of market
dominance. Deletion of this language, along with amendments rendering the final text of the
Article 2(1)(b) moot on the use of technical and economic factors once dominance is found, make
it clear that the regulation does not support a trade off analysis. See Pierre-Emmanuel Noel,
Efficiency Considerations in the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers under European and U.S.
Antitrust Law, 8 E.C.L. REV. 498, 503-04 (1997); CHRISTOPHER JONES & F. ENRIQUE
GONZALEZ-DIAZ, THE EEC MERGER REGULATION 153-58 (1992); see also SIR LEON BRITTAN,
COMPETITION POLICY AND MERGER CONTROL IN THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET 47 (1991).
(“[N]o words plucked from the [Merger] Regulation can give rise to a defence against the finding
that there is a dominant position.”).
100. Economic and technical benefits are only relevant to the extent that they do not “form an
obstacle to competition.” EU Merger Regulation, Article 2(1)(b).
101. See, e.g., JONES & GONZALEZ-DIAZ, supra note 99, at 156 (“there can be no efficiency
defence as such to a finding of durable dominance under the regulation”); C.J. COOK & C.S.
KERSE, E.C. MERGER CONTROL 167 (1996) (“There is no efficiency defence in the Regulation, in
the sense recognised in North American merger controls, and none has emerged from the
Commission’s application of it so far.”); Noel, supra note 99, at 512 (finding “no ‘efficiency
defence’ as such” in EU merger regulation). See also BARRY E. HAWK & HENRY L. HUSER,
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY MERGER CONTROL: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE 265 (1996) (technical
and economic progress and efficiencies have played only “minor role” in Commission
enforcement); Camesasca, supra note 12 (finding an “implicit efficiencies defence” sometimes
used to “tip the balance” against a finding of dominance).
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militating in favor of acceptance of remedial undertakings to allow mergers to
proceed.
In the leading case, Aerospatiale-Alenia/deHavilland,102 the
Commission examined a variety of efficiency-related advantages of the
proposed consolidation including improved management, cost savings in parts
procurement and marketing, and protection against currency fluctuations.
However, the Commission rejected the importance of such advantages because
of the merger’s propensity to enhance the dominant position of the combined
firm will be necessary. The decision refrained from endorsing the principle of
employing efficiencies as a counterweight to competitive concerns,103 and its
holding seemed to imply that most efficiency arguments will be unavailing in
the case of a finding of dominance.104 Likewise, in MSG Media Service105 the
Commission concluded that a joint venture would improve the prospect for the
spread of digital pay television through improved administrative and technical
support, but stated that such a factor should be considered only where the
concentration did not create or strengthen a dominant position or hinder
effective competition. In a number of other cases, the Commission also
expressly noted the potential for improvements in firm efficiency that would
enhance technological and economic progress but resisted clearance on those
grounds.106 Other Commission decisions can be seen to take efficiencies
improvements into account “between the lines” by incorporating analyses of
the dynamics of markets in entry analyses, market definition and evaluation of
the significance of market share data.107 Finally, in a number of cases the
Commission has employed findings of enhancement of efficiencies to bolster
its conclusion that the merger will increase or create market dominance.108
The EU’s reluctance to adopt an explicit efficiencies defense or to
incorporate efficiencies into its assessment of competitive effects may be as
much attributable to the fact that the Commission has until recently largely
102. Case No. IV/M.053 (Oct. 2, 1991), OJ L334/42 (Dec. 5, 1991).
103. See id. ¶ 65 (“Without prejudice as to whether [efficiency] considerations are relevant
for assessment under Article 2 of the Merger Regulations, such cost savings would have a
negligible impact on the overall operations” of the merged entity).
104. See JONES & GONZALEZ-DIAZ, supra note 99, at 158 (explaining that the de Havilland
decision confirms that “there can be no efficiency defence where there is clear market
dominance”).
105. Case No. IV/M.469 (Nov. 9, 1994), O.J. L364/1 (Dec. 31, 1994).
106. See Accor/Wagon Lits, Case No. IV/M.126 (Apr. 28, 1992), O.J. L 204/1 (July 21, 1992)
(insufficient proof that claimed efficiencies would outweigh anticompetitive effects); Nordic
Satellite Distrib., Case No. IV/M.490 (1995) (vertical integration creating significant scale and
scope efficiencies insufficient given propensity to strengthen dominant position).
107. See Camesasca, supra note 12, at 25-27 (summarizing cases in which efficiencies issues
played an important role in Commssion’s dynamic analysis of markets and competitive effects).
108. See, e.g., Du Pont/ICI, Case No. IV/M, 214 (Sept. 30,1992), O.J. L 7/13. See Frederick
Jenny, EEC Merger Control: Economies as an Antitrust Defense or an Antitrust Attack? 1992
FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 591 (1993).
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focused on cases involving single firm, rather than collective, dominance.
Mergers enhancing risks of oligopolistic market power may raise somewhat
different efficiencies issues in that efficiencies gains arising from a merger that
are not readily duplicated by rivals may reduce the likelihood and ease of
coordination.109 Hence, a stronger case for considering efficiencies may
present itself as the Commission evaluates more collective dominance cases. It
is important to note, however, that such evaluations going to the likelihood of
the exercise of market power can be made independently and without need to
undertake a trade-off analysis. Hence, the EU’s increasing focus on collective
dominance does not support adoption of the overall analytic approach taken by
the American antitrust authorities.
In sum, owing to its different history and goals, merger policy in the EU
has followed a trajectory that has to date steered away from the quagmire of an
explicit efficiencies defense. Undoubtedly, efficiencies have played a part in
many aspects of the Commission’s application of the merger laws, but they
have never risen to the level of offsetting competitive harms associated with a
merger. Hence, far from justifying the American movement toward fuller
evaluation of efficiencies through explicit trade off analysis, the roles of the
two authorities appear to be just the opposite. The EU may now be in a
position of facing pressures to follow suit to keep up with its American
counterpart and perhaps to leave itself the “flexibility” to endorse mergers that
suit political rather than competition-focused goals.
III. RISKS OF EU ADOPTION OF THE AMERICAN STANDARD
Embracing the American efficiencies defense to mergers and joint ventures
would serve neither the EU’s interest in effective antitrust enforcement nor
promote the need for a more certain set of rules governing border-spanning
mergers. First, as discussed in Section I of this essay, a myriad of normative
judgments and policy choices confront antitrust authorities devising an explicit
efficiencies defense. The vigorous disagreement among academics and policy
makers concerning the appropriate welfare standard to be applied should give
pause to EU competition authorities. Extensive debate on that subject has not
produced consensus, as first principles and normative judgments play an
important role in choosing a standard. The significance of the choice of
welfare standard cannot be overstated, as it strongly influences the complexity
of the efficiencies inquiry and the ease with which the defense can be asserted.
Leaving the standard ambiguous, as the United States has apparently done,
may invoke ad hoc applications of the doctrine and raise the cloud of
“political” jurisprudence.

109. See HAWK & HUSER, supra note 101, at 267-68.
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Second, the ex ante predictions required for analyzing efficiencies are
notoriously imprecise. The absence of a proven track record of forecasting
efficiencies and the dearth of accepted methodologies for doing so counsel
caution before enshrining a broad policy that will absolve otherwise
anticompetitive mergers. Where empirical judgments necessary to bring
enforcement actions are prone to high rates of error, merging parties will face
strong incentives to opportunistically seek out mergers that they would
otherwise forego. In this connection, it is notable that at many junctures the
American efficiency defense leaves wide discretion to the decisionmaker. The
approach of the Merger Guidelines has been to weigh heavily administrative
concerns and adopt pragmatic solutions, while leaving open the opportunity to
consider broad evidence where deemed appropriate. While flexibility is
desirable at the prosecutorial stage, the absence of reviewable standards and
clearly articulated doctrine poses obvious problems when the matter appears
before antitrust tribunals. In this regard, the experience of the American courts
is instructive and discouraging. Faced with the inherent uncertainties and
complexities of the efficiency inquiry, courts have resorted to evidentiary
shortcuts and other measures that fall far short of a meaningful balancing of
efficiencies and harms. In some instances, they have developed tests that make
little economic sense (e.g., the requirement that efficiencies be passed on to
consumers). In others they have resorted to evidentiary sleight of hand (e.g.,
relying on findings concerning the credibility of experts or assigning
dispositive weight to internal studies). In the end, the results of judicial
efficiencies inquiries seem pre-ordained by the courts’ conclusions on
competitive effects.
The impact of a potent efficiencies defense on reviews of transnational
mergers and joint ventures raises a host of additional concerns. The mix of
inherently uncertain factual determinations and discretion-laden decisional
rules would seem an open invitation to ad hoc judgments. Given the inevitable
political and nationalist undercurrents when governments review transnational
combinations, the efficiencies defense would seem to afford an all-tooconvenient tool for disguising industrial policy as competition analysis. To
give one pertinent example, permitting efficiencies justifications in one market
to offset anticompetitive effects in a second market poses real risks of this
kind. Antitrust enforcers may be strongly tempted to protect mergers having
anticompetitive effects abroad where efficiencies will be realized by domestic
firms. In such scenarios antitrust law can be corrupted to serve as a vehicle for
externalizing costs of mergers and promoting national interests. To be sure,
such risks are present in applying other aspects of merger analysis. However,
where doctrine is ill-defined, the corrective pressures of international scrutiny
may not be as effective.
A second consequence of an expanded efficiencies defense is the
likelihood of a “race to the bottom” among antitrust authorities. Faced with
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the prospect of being seen as applying an overly-restrictive efficiencies test as
compared to that of other competition authorities, enforcers may well conclude
that the best policy is a lenient policy. Such perceptions can easily ratchet
antitrust standards downward, as a kind of Gresham’s Law fosters dilution of
enforcement involving mergers with an international dimension. Even if
national authorities avoided this downward spiral, deference to each others’
judgments in merger cases would be less likely. Given the lack of transparency
in efficiency analyses, second-guessing of mergers cleared by foreign
authorities with greater economic interests and access to information seems
inevitable. Not only would this slow progress towards harmonization of
merger standards, but, by making bilateral enforcement less effective, it would
also increase international frictions and encourage confrontations of the sort
experienced in the McDonnell Douglas/Boeing merger.
Finally, the American experience with efficiency defense illustrates the
paradox that such reviews push antitrust authorities toward imposing highly
regulatory restrictions in order to assure that efficiencies are actually achieved
and passed on to consumers. Restructuring, mandatory licensing, price-freezes
and other edicts have become familiar remedies in settlements that allow
mergers to go forward. Where efficiencies are the central issue, however,
these remedies take on a decidedly intrusive flavor that may include outright
supervision of rates or output. The desire of enforcement agencies to “lock in”
the promised savings and ensure that consumers will benefit from them has led
some American enforcement agencies and courts down a slippery slope toward
outright rate regulation. In accepting highly regulatory consent agreements,
these enforcers have assumed a role they are institutionally ill-equipped to
perform. Applying similar remedies to international mergers would unwisely
blur the line between competition policy and trade regulation and would serve
to strengthen the hand of those who advocate industrial policy solutions to
economic problems.
IV. CONCLUSION
Antitrust guidelines serve the public interest when they reflect a strong
consensus about appropriate antitrust policy and articulate standards that
clarify the factual and legal determinations made by agencies and the courts.
Where consensus and clear standards are lacking, as was the case with the
Justice Department’s analysis of entry barriers in the 1982 iteration of its
Merger Guidelines, they may actually increase confusion and uncertainty.110
This essay places the American efficiency defense guidelines in the latter
category. The EU is best advised to stay clear of the entanglements these
110. See Jonathan Baker, The Problem with Baker-Hughes and Syufy: On the Role of Entry
Analysis in Merger Analysis, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 353 (1997); Richard Schmalensee, Ease of
Entry: Has the Concept Been Applied Too Readily?, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 41 (1987).
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guidelines are likely to foster and thereby prevent the potential politicization of
international merger reviews.
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